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poses of the bill is to limit the duty of out-of-State corporations,
dealing primarily in interstate commerce, to collect use taxes from
purchasers - in effect to curb the extraterritorial reach of State tax-
ing authorities. The Interstate Tax Act grants immunity to mail-
order houses whose contact with other States is limited to the United
States mail and delivery by common carriers. The bill also immu-
nizes out-of-State corporations which send employees to other States
for the sole purpose of soliciting orders."' Presently the bill is
awaiting debate on the floor of the House. Whatever its fate may
be, the Interstate Tax Act dearly manifests a realization of the ne-
cessity for national guidelines - guidelines which will permit in-
terstate businesses to pay their share of State and local taxes, and,
at the same time to enjoy a long-awaited liberation from multiple
and unjust taxation.
JAmEs M. KLEIN
CRIMINAL LAW - RIGHT TO COUNSEL AT PRETRIAL
IDENTIFICATION - PROSPECTIVE APPLICATION
Stovall v. Denno, 388 U.S. 293 (1967).
The defendant in Stovall v. Denno' was arrested and taken into
custody for fatally stabbing a man and seriously wounding his wife.
After major surgery saved the latter's life, several police officials
brought the defendant into her hospital room to confront him with
his alleged victim. From her bed, the woman identified the de-
fendant as her assailant and the killer of her husband. In the sub-
sequent State murder trial, she made an in-court identification of
the accused and also testified to her hospital room identification.
The accused.was then convicted and sentenced to death.
The instant habeas corpus proceeding presented two issues:
whether a newly promulgated rule of criminal procedure, requiring
the exclusion of identification evidence tainted by exhibiting the
respect to tangible personal property of a person without a business location
in the State or an individual without a dwelling place in the State; but nothing
in this subsection shall affect the power of a State or political subdivision to
impose a use tax if the destination of the sale is in the State and the seller has
a business location in the State or regularly makes household deliveries in the
State.
31Id. § 513(d) (1967). But see Scripto, Inc. v. Carson, 362 U.S. 207 (1960). It
seems that H.R. 2158 would, in effect, overrule Scripto.
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accused to witnesses before trial in the absence of counsel,' was to be
applied retroactively and thus govern the instant case, and whether
on the facts of this case the defendant was denied due process of law
in violation of the 14th amendment. Although these issues may be
considered as inextricably bound together, the former was exceed-
ingly more important than the latter, for its resolution would have
a profound impact on all future judicially created rules of criminal
procedure.
In Stovall, the Supreme Court held that the new rules in United
States v. Wade4 and Gilbert v. California,' announced on the same
day the instant case was decided, were not applicable to the defend-
ant. The rules will operate prospectively from the date of deci-
sion, affecting only pretrial confrontations in the absence of counsel
which occurred after that date.' Furthermore, a majority of the
Court determined that the defendant had not been denied due proc-
ess of law.7
In holding that the right to counsel at pretrial identifications
would affect only future cases, the Court again endorsed a recent
trend towards prospective application of its new rules governing
criminal procedure in State trials. In 1965, Linkletter v. Walker8
held that the fourth amendment rule excluding evidence of unlaw-
fully seized property in State trials9 would apply only to those cases
not yet final at the time the rule was announced."0 One year later,
in Tehan v. United States ex rel. Shott," the Court held that the
1388 U.S. 293 (1967).
2 Defendant, the only Negro in the room, was handcuffed to one of five police offi-
cers. Although two members of the district attorney's staff were present, defendant had
no counsel to assist or advise him. 388 U.S. at 295.
3 See Gilbert v. California, 388 U.S. 263 (1967); United States v. Wade, 388 U.S.
218 (1967).
4 388 U.S. 218 (1967). It is interesting to note that Wade was decided on certio-
rari from a federal circuit court, while in Stovall all direct methods of review had been
exhausted, which may be a salient point in the Court's denial of retroactivity.
r 388 U.S. 263 (1967). This case was also decided on certiorari by means of a di-
rect petition from a State court.
6 388 U.S. at 296-301.
71d. at 301-02.
8381 U.S. 618 (1965). This was a State prisoner's habeas corpus proceeding, all
his direct appeals having been exhausted.
9 Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1961).
10 The Court here had devised the so-called "finality" test: "By final we mean where
the judgment of conviction was rendered, the availability of appeal exhausted, and the
time for petition for certiorari had elapsed before our decision in Mapp v. Ohio." 381
U.S. at 622 n.5.
11382 U.S. 406 (1966). The "finality" test was also used in this case, a habeas cor-
pus proceeding by a State prisoner.
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fifth amendment rule prohibiting comment by the prosecutor on
the defendant's failure to testify in State trials 2 likewise governed
only those cases not yet final when the rule was promulgated.
Next, Johnson v. New Jersey" set forth a harsher rule of prospec-
tivity from the defendant's perspective, by holding that the fifth and
sixth amendment rules requiring exclusion of evidence as to state-
ments by the accused during in-custody interrogation in the absence
of counsel 4 would affect only cases in which the trial had begun on
or after the dates on which the rules had been announced. 5 Sto-
vall took the holding of Johnson one step farther by granting appli-
cation of Wade and Gilbert only to those cases in which an actual
violation of the rule, i.e., an invalid lineup, had occurred on or after
the date of the latter two decisions.' 6
In order to comprehend the impact of the above decisions, the
history of the application of new rules of law must be reviewed.
Traditionally, courts have given unlimited retrospective effect to a
decision which overruled prior law or created previously unpro-
nounced law.' This was accomplished through tacit application
of the jurisprudential theory that all law was declaratory, that is,
the courts discovered and declared the law, and an overruled deci-
sion was a failure at discovery - it never was the law.'" The hold-
ing in the overruling case, therefore, was not new law. Rather it
was an application of what was and always had been the only cor-
12 Griffin v. California, 380 U.S. 609 (1965).
'3 384 U.S. 719 (1966).
14 Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966); Escobedo v. Illinois, 378 U.S. 478
(1964).
15 The Court declined use of the "finality" test because the reason for its creation in
Linkletter and application in Tehan was not present; the rules of Escobedo and Miranda
had not previously been applied to any case on direct appeal. 384 U.S. at 732.
16 The Escobedo case was decided on June 22, 1964, and the Miranda case was de-
cided on June 13, 1966. Note 14 supra. Under the holding of Johnson, the rules of
Miranda and Escobedo would apply to all instances in which the trial had begun on or
after those respective dates, regardless of when the defendant's rights had been "vio-
lated" at an in-custody interrogation. But Wade, Gilbert, and Stovall were all decided
on June 12, 1967, and the Court held that only those cases in which the "invalid" pre-
trial identification occurred on or after that date would be affected by the Wade and
Gilbert rules. Thus, if a "violation" occurred after the pretrial lineups of Wade and
Gilbert, but before the decisions were rendered in those cases on June 12, 1967, the
rules would not be applicable even if the trial did not start until after that date.
17 See Annot., 10 A.L.R.3d 1371 (1966). In cases pronouncing a new rule of law
courts have historically favored the policy of endowing the victorious party with the
benefit of the new rule, especially when injustice and hardship could thereby be avoided.
Id. at 1377-82.
18 See 1 W. BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES 69-71 (Dawson ed. 1966). William
Blackstone announced this theory more than two centuries ago, but its repercussions are
still being felt in American courts.
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rect law."0 Thus, the "correct law" could be applied to cases which
had reached finality long before the overruling decision.0
Countervailing the declaratory theory was the Austinian theory,
a more pragmatic approach which stated that although the over-
ruled decision was invalid law it could not be completely erased by
subsequent action of the courts.2 Cases decided under the prior
incorrect law were not to be disturbed, lest all judicial holdings
vacillate on the contingency that they might at some later time be
overruled.22 Thus, new law must be given prospective application
in order to eliminate an apprehension which could reach to the
foundations of the juridical system. 23
These philosophical theories, declaratory and Austinian, are pre-
sented above in their extremes to illustrate the impracticality of
both. No long dissertation is needed to reveal the harsh results
which either might impose on litigants who have relied on a deci-
sion only to have it subsequently overruled. However, since the
application of either theory is an implementation of judicial policy
rather than judicial power,24 the question must inevitably arise as
to which philosophy should be employed in a given case.
The Supreme Court has attempted to determine whether retro-
activity or prospectivity is justified for a new law in the field of
19 Id. at 70. For a discussion of Blackstone's theory and antagonistic arguments, see
E. PATrRmoN, JURISPRUDENCE: MEN AND IDEAS OF T-HE LAw 571-79 (1953).
20 This is but a logical extension of Blackstone's declaratory theory. It is interesting
to note, however, that even the great Vinerian professor himself expressed grave reser-
vations about wholesale retroactive application of criminal laws. Indeed, in some in-
stances he felt that criminal decisions should be given only prospective application. 1
W. BLAcKSTONE, supra note 18, at 46.
21 This positivist theory gradually evolved through the growing apprehension con-
cerning the soundness of Blackstone's jurisprudential philosophy. A. AUSTIN, LEC-
TUIRES ON JURISPRtUDEN E 221-34 (4th ed. 1873).
22 See J. BENT-AM, A COMMENT ON THE COMMENTARIES 190-95 (Everett ed.
1928). Jeremy Bentham attended Blackstone's lectures on English law and was im-
mediately critical of the "frivolous" reasons given for various rules cof law. E. PATTER-
SON, supra note 19, at 471. Austin, a follower of Bentham, likewise deplored the un-
certainty of judge-made law under the declaratory theory. Id. at 571-72.
2 3 Many legal methodologists have attacked unlimited retroactive application of an
overruling decision and have advocated the use of prospectivity as a device to solidify
judge-made law. See, e.g., J.C. GRAY, THE NATURE AND SOURCES OF THE LAW 94-
100 (2d ed. 1921); Levy, Realist Jurisprudence and Prospective Overruling, 109 U.
PA, L. REV. 1 (1960). One author proposed a model statute to authorize prospective
overruling in all courts. Kocourek, Retrospective Decisions and Stare Decisis and a
Proposal, 17 A.B.A.J. 180 (1931).
24 It is generally accepted that a court may choose for itself whether to employ the
declaratory or the Austinian theory, for the court's choice is dictated by its policy in
precedent, not by any inherent power to apply either philosophy. See, e.g., Justice
Cardozo's opinion for the Court in Great N. Ry. v. Sunburst Oil & Ref. Co., 287 U.S.
358, 362-64 (1932). See also Annot., supra note 17, at 1374.
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criminal procedure by gradually evolving a third theory which may
be termed the "functional approach." Linkletter, the first case to
deny retrospective application -to a privilege emanating from the
Bill of Rights, employed the Austinian theory as a vehicle for arriv-
ing at the functional approach. Relying on the fact that the Con-
stitution neither requires nor prohibits retroactive application," the
Court drew its justifications for prospectivity from a series of Austin-
ian decisions. In 1932, the Supreme Court held in Great Northern
Railway Co. v. Sunburst Oil & Refining Co.26 that a State could
constitutionally apply its overruling decisions in future cases only:
"Indeed, there are cases intimating, too broadly . .. that it must
give them that effect; but never has any doubt been expressed that
it may so treat them if it pleases, whenever injustice or hardship will
thereby be averted . *..."27 Eight years later, in Chicot County
Drainage District v. Baxter State Bank,"8 the Court held that, in an
action involving collateral attack upon a prior judgment, no invio-
late principle of retroactive application could be justified:
The past cannot always be erased by a new judicial declaration.
The effect of the subsequent overruling as to the invalidity may
have to be considered in various aspects, - with respect to par-
ticular relations . . . and particular conduct. . . . Questions of
rights,.. . of status, of prior determinations deemed to have final-
ity and acted upon accordingly, of public policy ... [all] demand
examination.29
The proper criteria of the functional approach can therefore be
seen as evolving from the previously discussed cases. To determine
the operation of a new rule, a court must balance the merits of the
case by first reviewing any prior history of the rule in question.
Then it must look to the purpose and effect of the new rule, the
reliance placed on the prior law, and the impact on the administra-
tion of justice if the new rule is to be given retrospective application.
Once specifically laid down in Linkletter, ° these same guidelines
25 381 U.S. at 622.
26287 U.S. 358 (1932).
27Id. at 364.
28308 U.S. 371 (1940).
29 Id. at 374. It is interesting to note that in James v. United States, 366 U.S. 213
(1961), three concurring Justices thought that reliance on a past decision was a sufficient
reason to overrule the prior law prospectively in a manner such that the new rule would
not apply to the immediate defendant but it would apply to all defendants in future
trials.
30 381 U.S. at 629, 636, wherein the guidelines were spelled out by the Court for
the first time in their present form.
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have been followed with varying weight in Tehan,3' Johnson,2 and
Stovall.3 However, in utilizing these functional criteria, the Court
has found it necessary to make further delineations. Thus, when
the purpose of a rule of criminal procedure is to protect the process
of guilt-determination at trial by excluding unreliable evidence or
to prevent a clear danger of convicting the innocent by providing
the accused with a means to procure a proper defense, then it ought
to be given retroactive effect. But when the purpose of the new
rule is to exclude reliable evidence in an effort to deter offensive
police practices or to protect the integrity of the judicial system, then
the rule should be given prospective effect only."4
This reasoning of the Court is too logical to admit conceptual
defeat. The difficulty arises from the subjective manner in which
the Court must determine the purpose for a rule; i.e., whether it
falls into that category of rules which bears a dose relationship to
the fairness of truth-determination at trial and must be given retro-
spective application. Linkletter refused retroactivity because State
courts had relied on the fact that prior law did not exclude highly
reliable, but illegally seized, evidence and the purpose of the rule
was said to be a deterrent to offensive police practices.35  Similarly,
the refusal to apply retroactivity in Tehan was because a State prose-
cutor's comment on the defendant's failure to testify was held not
to relate to the ascertainment of truth. Comment was eliminated
both to ensure that the prosecution would shoulder its burden of
proof and to discourage courts from penalizing the defendant's ex-
ercise of the privilege against self-incrimination. 6
3 382 U.S. at 410, 415, wherein the Court gave much weight to the purpose of the
new rule.
32 384 U.S. at 727. The Court here gave divided weight to reliance on previous
law and the purpose of the new rule, but the deciding factor for prospective application
was that the purpose of the rule could be effected through a means other than retroac-
tivity.
33 388 U.S. at 297. As in Johnson, the fact that the new rule could be effectuated
in another manner was deemed important, but overwhelming emphasis was placed on
the fact that retroactive application would seriously hamper the administration of jus-
tice. See note 47 infra & accompanying text. One author has pointed out the possible
arbitrariness of such a policy: "A court is on weak grounds when it denies justice be-
cause it is worried about its work load. Yet, when no injustice will result, judicial ad-
ministration is a legitimate concern." Bartlett, Prospective Overruling and Property
Law, 18 W. REs. L. REv. 1205, 1235 (1967), wherein the writer also discussed the his-
tory of overruling and prospectivity in criminal cases. Id. at 1210-18, 1231-36.
34 Compare Linkletter v. Walker, 381 U.S. 618 (1965), with Gideon v. Wainwright,
372 U.S. 335 (1963).
35 381 U.S. at 637.
86 382 U.S. at 415.
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In Johnson, however, ,the Court could not state definitely that
the right to counsel at in-custody interrogation might never relate
to the integrity of the factfinding process, since the possibility of
coercive questioning in the absence of counsel might render any
statements of the accused involuntary and thus unreliable evidence.
Therefore, the Court dwelled on different criteria:
[Wle emphasize that the question whether a constitutional rule
of criminal procedure does or does not enhance the reliability of
the fact-finding process at trial is necessarily a matter of degree.
* . .We are thus concerned with a question of probabilities and
must take account, among other factors, of the extent to which
other safeguards are available to protect the integrity of the truth-
determining process at trialaT
The purpose of the rule was said to be a guard against any possibil-
ity of unreliable statements being obtained through interrogation,
that is, to give full effect to the fifth amendment privilege against
self-incrimination by employing the sixth amendment right to coun-
sel as a protective device. 8 This was but a further extension of
rights granted previously under the fifth amendment. Therefore,
the purpose of the new rule could be adequately accomplished
through another method, without giving it retroactive application,
i.e., by allowing the defendant in a habeas corpus proceeding to
claim that his statements were acquired against his will in violation
of traditional standards of due process. 9  Furthermore, as had been
asserted in Linkletter and Tehan, retroactive application of the new
rule would not have the justifiable effect of curing errors committed
by police in violation of that rule, while at the same time it would
tend to disrupt the administration of the criminal courts.4"
Stovall has further delineated among the proper criteria, and
may be read as the most recent culmination and furthest extension
of the functional approach.4' Indeed, it may be interpreted as the
37 384 U.S. at 729-30.
381d. at 730.
30 See Davis v. North Carolina, 384 U.S. 737 (1966). This companion case to
Johnson was employed as a vehicle to promulgate the "other safeguards" method of
attack, to be used whenever prospectivity barred the defendant's access to the new rule.
In Johnson, the Court foresaw two possible methods of protecting the reliability of the
factfinding process: retroactive application of the new rule or an independent test on
collateral attack to determine whether the defendant's statements were voluntarily made.
Given that choice, the Court selected the latter method and detailed its implementation
in Davis.
40 384 U.S. at 731.
41The Court has distorted the fine line between reliable and unreliable evidence in
an effort to justify its prospective application of a new rule. The 'final guideline of the
functional approach - whether retroactivity would have an adverse effect on the admin-
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first time that the sixth amendment right to counsel, standing alone,
has not been given retrospective application. As with previously
imposed exclusionary rules, 2 the holdings of Wade and Gilbert re-
quiring counsel at a pretrial identification were aimed at deterring
arbitrary and offensive police practices and ensuring the fundamen-
tal fairness of our judicial system.43
A violation of this new requirement creates a substantial threat
of unreliable evidence being admitted at trial, because the secret
and suggestive circumstances surrounding a pretrial identification
would tend to impair the objective judgment of a witness. Thus,
an in-court identification, based solely on the previous confronta-
tion, would be similarly unreliable.44 Moreover, if a witness does
not testify as to the earlier confrontation, but still identifies the ac-
cused in court relying on the previous and possibly defective iden-
tification, then the defendant is denied his fundamental sixth
amendment right of cross-examination of witnesses.45 Thus, the
defendant would have no means of attacking the in-court identifica-
tion unless counsel had been present at the pretrial confrontation to
view the reliability of the "factfinding process" of identificatibn.
While asserting that presence of counsel was designed to en-
hance the reliability of identification evidence, the Stovall Court
nevertheless relied heavily on language from Johnson in holding
that whether lack of counsel would inevitably infect "the integrity
of the truth-determining process at trial is a 'question of probabili-
istration of justice - has been given more weight than ever before. See notes 44-47
infra & accompanying text.
42 See, e.g., Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966); Griffin v. California, 380
U.S. 609 (1965); Escobedo v. Illinois, 378 U.S. 478 (1964); Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S.
643 (1961).
43 The Court in W1ade concluded that if before the trial a witness makes an in-court
identification of an accused after having viewed him in absence of counsel, such evi-
dence must be excluded unless it can be shown that it had an "independent origin" or
that its admission would be "harmless error." 388 U.S. at 239-42; see Chapman v.
California, 386 U.S. 18 (1967) (harmless error test); Wong Sun v. United States, 371
U.S. 471 (1963) (independent origin test).
In Gilbert, the Court proclaimed that it was constitutional error to admit in-court
identifications without first determining if they were tainted by the illegal pretrial
lineup or were of "independent origin." 388 U.S. at 272.
44 388 U.S. at 273.
41 388 U.S. at 235. The Court reiterated the fear enunciated in Escobedo that the
trial might become merely an appeal from the pretrial identification. Id. at 226. In
1964, the Court had granted the right to counsel for in-custody interrogation proceed-
ings in order to prevent the trial from becoming an appeal from that "critical stage."
Escobedo v. Illinois, 378 U.S. 478, 487-88 (1964). Concerning the proposition that a
defendant has an absolute right to iross-examination, see Pointer v. Texas, 380 U.S. 400
(1965).
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ties' ...."" Although in Johnson the Court analyzed the proba-
bilities and concluded that other safeguards were still available to
protect the reliability of the evidence, in Stovall it scanned the prob-
abilities and then took a novel approach by stating: "Such proba-
bilities must in turn be weighed against the prior justified reliance
upon the old standard and the impact of retroactivity upon the ad-
ministration of justice."47  The Court felt that the new rule was
necessary to prevent the possibility of any unfairness, but that retro-
active application would require courts -to reexamine thousands of
cases in which there was no real prejudice even though counsel was
not present at a pretrial identification. In an apparent effort to pay
homage to the "other safeguards" test promulgated in Johnson
wherein the aggrieved defendant was afforded a method of collat-
eral review, the Court in Stovall granted the accused the privilege
of alleging and proving on collateral attack that the pretrial con-
frontation was a violation of due process of law under the 14th
amendment. However, unlike the alternate safeguard permissible
under Johnson, the Stovall due process test is not grounded specifi-
cally upon that which the new rule seeks to protect - the reliability
of evidence taken in absence of counsel. Rather, it is grounded
upon broad notions of fundamental fairness,48 and may not always
be adequate to ensure reliability.
Thus the proper criteria of the functional approach have been
shifted to the extent that the Court subjectively deemed a substan-
tial burden on the administration of justice the plausible justification
for employing Stovall as a vehicle to render prospective a ruling
which gave defendants the right to counsel at a "critical stage." In-
deed, a serious question must arise concerning the source of power
which the Court used not only to govern the case, but also to create
the rule which Stovall rendered prospective. That source must nec-
essarily be the same in both instances.
In both Wade and Gilbert, the sixth amendment right to coun-
sel was applied to a stage in the adversary proceedings which had
not previously been considered critical. Application of the new
rule of criminal procedure was easily made in Wade, a federal case,
since the Supreme Court has supervisory power over the federal
46 388 U.S. at 298.
47 Id.
48 In Stovall, the due process test and the powers used by the majority to employ it
were attacked by Justice Black in his dissenting opinion. 388 U.S. at 303-06.
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courts.49 Yet, the feasibility of applying the same rule in Gilbert,
a State case, is questionable since the Court has no supervisory power
over State courts, but only a limited constitutional power via the
14th amendment. Since the new rule was rendered strictly prospec-
tive in Stovall, it is doubtful that the rule can be considered "funda-
mental" to the constitutional provisions of the sixth amendment
and thus, it would not apply to the States through the 14th amend-
ment. Apparently, then, the Court has created a sixth amendment
rule for the State courts through an unwarranted exercise of its su-
pervisory power, rather than solely through an implementation of
the 14th amendment.5" Indeed; the Supreme Court may have al-
lowed the functional approach to dissolve a distinction which tradi-
tionally has been thought to exist: provisions fundamental to the
Bill of Rights are only applicable to the States through the due proc-
ess clause of the 14th amendment, but an exercise of supervisory
powers to fashion rules implementing the Bill of Rights is valid
only in relation to federal courts."1
Such an exercise of the Court's power, however, is not unique
in Stovall, for it has been evident in other recent cases."2 In order
to justify an imposition of new rules of criminal procedure on the
States, the Court has gradually expanded the scope of the Bill of
Rights through a theory of penumbral rights which emanate from
the literal provisions of the constitutional amendments.5" Although
it is beyond the scope of the present discussion to attempt a com-
plete review of the penumbral rights theory in relation to the exer-
cise of supervisory powers over State courts in lieu of the implemen-
tation of the specific provisions of the Bill of Rights through the
14th amendment, it is interesting to view the problem as evidenced
in Stovall.
49The Supreme Court's supervisory power over federal courts has been implied
from U.S. CoNsT. art. III, § 1; see Ker v. California, 374 U.S. 23, 31 (1963).
50 Other Supreme Court decisions have also failed to define clearly the power exer-
cised over the State courts. See, e.g., Chapman v. California, 386 U.S. 18 (1967); Parker
v. Gladden, 385 U.S. 363 (1966); Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1961) . See also 19
CASB W. RBs. L. Riv. 157, 160-67 (1967).
51 Cf. McNabb v. United States, 318 U.S. 332, 340-41 (1943). Justice Black's
dissent in Wade should also be noted. 388 U.S. at 243-50.
52 See cases cited note 50 supra.
53 Penumbral rights are not stated specifically in the Bill of Rights, but are implied
to give "life, meaning, and substance" to the specific provisions. See Griswold v. Con-
necticut, 381 U.S. 479, 483-84 (1965). Many noted authors feel that the creation of
penumbral rights is an exercise of the Court's supervisory powers, and thus, they are not
binding on the States. See, e.g., Freund, Constitutional Dilemmas, 45 B.U.L. REv. 13,
19-20 (1965); Friendly, The Bill of Rights as a Code of Criminal Procedure, 53 CALF.
L REv. 929, 934-40 (1965).
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Initially, the sixth amendment right to counsel was held to be
violated when a State court did not afford an indigent the benefit
of an attorney at a felony trial." Similarly, the Court has held that
the assistance of counsel is necessary at pretrial arraignment"s and
on appeal. 6 These rights were considered so fundamental to due
process and equal protection of law that they were given retroactive
effect. But in Miranda v. Arizona, 7 which was rendered prospec-
tive in Johnson, the Court held that the police have an affirmative
duty at the stage of in-custody interrogation to inform the accused
in an effective manner that he has the right to counsel for protec-
tion of his privilege against self-incrimination. Imposing this duty
on the police is admittedly only one possible means of ensuring fair-
ness to the accused when he is being questioned about a crime,5" as
is requiring the presence of counsel at pretrial identification only
one method of ensuring that the accused is presented to witnesses
in a proper manner.5" Therefore, since other means are available
which can constitutionally serve the same purpose, the States should
conceivably be free to exercise their own prerogatives rather than
having the Court fashion all-encompassing rules for them. Justice
Harlan's dissenting opinion in Chapman v. California" stated the
argument well:
The primary responsibility for the trial of state criminal cases
still rests upon the States, and the only constitutional limitation
upon these trials is that the laws, rules, and remedies applied must
meet constitutional requirements. If they do not, this Court may
hold them invalid. The Court has no power, however, to declare
which of many admittedly constitutional alternatives a State may
choose. To impose uniform national requirements when alterna-
tives are constitutionally permissible would destroy that oppor-
tunity for broad experimentation which is the genius of our
federal system.61
By rejecting this argument, a majority of the Court has tacitly ex-
pressed the implication that it feels the necessity for imposing upon
the States a uniform national system of criminal procedure. How-
54 Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335 (1963).
55 Hamilton v. Alabama, 368 U.S. 52 (1961).
56 Douglas v. California, 372 U.S. 353 (1963).
5 384 U.S. 436 (1966).
G8Id. at 444.
59 388 U.S. at 238-39.
60 386 U.S. 18 (1967). The Court in this case dismissed the California "harmless
error" provision in the State constitution as being too vague and fashioned its own
"harmless error" test for State courts to follow.
61 Id. at 47-48.
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ever, in order to implement such a system in a manner which will
not burden the administration of justice in State courts, retroactive
application must be denied to the new rules. Prospective appli-
cation is conceptually justifiable because these recent rules, while
clamping down on offensive police practices, operate to exclude
what may well be highly reliable evidence. 2 Furthermore, retro-
active application has always been granted by the Court to exclude
what it deems to be unreliable evidence, 3 and presumably it always
will do so in the future. Therefore, only two real problems remain
to trouble constitutional lawyers: the subjective approach of the
Court in determining which evidence is reliable and which is unre-
liable, and the possible lack of a justifiable source of power which
would permit the Court to impose any new rules upon the States.
The first problem has been alleviated somewhat by the promul-
gation of various due process tests to be used on collateral attack
when the defendant claims the privilege of a new rule which pro-
spective application has denied to his case. 4 Although the due
process test may not be sufficient to determine the reliability of evi-
dence in all pretrial identification cases, in the conveniently chosen
vehicular case of Stovall the "reasonableness" of the collateral tests
was amply illustrated. The Court viewed the totality of the circum-
stances under which the defendant had been confronted with the
victim for purposes of identification and found no violation of the
14th amendment. The witness in Stovall was the only person who
could identify the defendant and she might have died in the hospi-
tal before seeing him. Thus, the "emergency" status of this pretrial
confrontation may be said to eliminate the necessity of counsel's
protection in much the same manner as the taking of a blood sample
from the accused in an emergency situation does not require the
police to provide the protection of counsel or to procure a warrant.0 5
Both relate to what should be reliable physical identification evi-
dence. Indeed, in light of the witness's recovery from surgery and
subsequent in-court identification in Stovall, the failure to provide
counsel for the hospital confrontation may well have been a "harm-
62 In Massiah v. United States, 377 U.S. 201, 208-10 (1964), Justice White deliv-
ered a torrid dissenting opinion in which he expressed grave doubt for the necessity of
creating rules of criminal procedure which exclude relevant and reliable evidence.
63 See, e.g., Jackson v. Denno, 378 U.S. 368 (1964); Reck v. Pate, 367 U.S. 433.
(1961).
6 4 See, e.g., Davis v. North Carolina, 384 U.S. 737 (1966).
65 Schmerber v. California, 384 U.S. 757 (1966).
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less error,"66 for counsel may have been able to do little more than
the police had done to ensure the reliability of the earlier identifica-
tion, under the circumstances.
The second problem, concerning the Court's source of power,
has been hidden by the functional approach to the law. According
to some, there has been no constitutional justification for imposing
the recent rules of criminal procedure upon the States, for the rules
have no foundation in the specific provisions of the 14th amend-
ment or the Bill of Rights, since they are based on the judicially
created theory of penumbral rights.67 But the logical criteria of the
Court, in determining whether a rule must be given prospective ap-
plication have evolved into a self-contained system of balance of
powers. By reviewing the function, background, and impact of a
new rule, and by further differentiating between those rules which
protect the fairness of guilt-determination and those which merely
curb offensive police practices, the Court has given all lower courts
a modicum of certainty for future decisionmaking. State courts now
have much new precedent to draw upon in their effort to ensure
defendants a fair trial and police officials realize what is required
of them for the future. Any further rules of criminal procedure
which the Court fashions for the States will presumably be given
prospective effect only, 8 for all the areas of the adversary system
which could promote unreliable evidence are hopefully protected.
New rules will probably focus on the action of police officials, on
that "Bill of Duties" which prevents infringement of the integrity
of our juridical system. Finally, it actually appears that the major-
ity and dissenting opinions of the Court may differ only in respect
to the amount of faith each would place in the capacity of State po-
lice to protect the rights of the accused while they are protecting
society. 9 It is submitted that the Warren Court may be dose to
accomplishing its apparent goal, a uniform national system of crim-
inal procedure.
TERENCE J. CLARK
66 See Chapman v. California, 386 U.S. 18 (1967).
67 Freund, supra note 53; Friendly supra note 53; see 19 CASE W. RES. L. REV.
157, 160-67 (1967).
68 In light of the recent trend, these rules would most likely operate prospectively
from the date of the decision in which they were announced. It is submitted that the
best course for the Court to follow would be to announce prospectivity in the cases creat-
ing the new rules, rather than awaiting a convenient vehicular case.
69 See Escobedo v. Illinois, 378 U.S. 478, 499 (1964) (White, J. dissenting).
